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ABSTRACT: Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain
convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than
focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this article analyzes recent
US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security
cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and
opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers
will f ind recommendations on how US Army security force assistance
and security cooperation can shape environments and deter conflict in the
US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.
K e y w o r d s : S FA B , m u l t i - d o m a i n , c o m p e t i t i o n , d e t e r r e n c e ,
USINDOPACOM

T

he US Indo-Pacific website states, “USINDOPACOM
is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region
by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful
development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when
necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence,
and military readiness.” 1 In 2021, in the Interim United States National
Security Strategic Guidance, President Joe Biden elevated the People’s
Republic of China as the primary military threat to the United States.2
Consequently, the US military renewed its emphasis on competition
within
the
US
Indo-Pacific
Command
(USINDOPACOM)
area of responsibility (AOR). As US strategic focus moves away
from US Central Command following the conclusion of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, the US Army must reassess its roles and look beyond its
combat capabilities to aid in the success of the Joint force mission, specifically
the operating environment of Indo-Pacific Command, to retain its relevance
in the shifting strategic environment.
Security force assistance brigades (SFABs) can play a crucial role due
to doctrinal, organizational, and extensive specialized training capabilities
1. “About United States Indo-Pacific Command,” PACOM, n.d., accessed October 23, 2022,
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/.
2. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021 (Washington, DC:
White House, 2021): 8.
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in partner integration. Since the Indo-Pacific’s strategic and operational
environments lie primarily in the air and maritime domains, security force
assistance brigades could play a vital role in enabling convergence and
synchronizing cross-domain effects by cognition and effort beyond physical
mass within multi-domain competition. Integrating brigades with partnered
foreign security forces will allow the US Army to leverage partner
multi-domain capabilities in complementary ways to US Joint and interagency
capabilities and achieve a relative advantage in regional competition.
This article considers roles security force assistance brigades can fill
to enable combined multi-domain convergence in competition below
the threshold of armed conflict. It examines current military problems in
the Indo-Pacific, discusses how the brigades can address these problems,
and provides recommendations for how to enable multi-domain competition.

The Indo-Pacific Problem
The central military problem in the Indo-Pacific Command is determining
how the Joint force can maintain freedom of action and impose its will
against peer adversaries in all domains to deter conflict while reestablishing
a position of strategic advantage. The most effective and efficient way
to do so is by retaining existing positions of advantage. While the air and
maritime domains remain the main areas of focus in the Indo-Pacific,
naval theorist Julian S. Corbett’s emphasis on the interdependence of the
land and maritime domains suggests that retaining a Landpower advantage
remains vital.3
The second military problem to avoid is losing the first battle of the next
conflict.4 If North Korea attacked either Japan or South Korea, the Joint
force would need to secure a swift initial victory to maintain its Landpower
advantage. Chief of Staff of the Army General James C. McConville defines
Landpower advantage as sustaining the fight, expanding the battlespace,
striking in-depth across domains, gaining and maintaining decision
dominance, creating overmatch, and prevailing in large-scale ground conflict.5
Given the Army’s considerable executive agent responsibilities in sustaining

3. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).
First published in 1918 by Longmans, Green.
4. Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win
in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2021), 5.
5. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 6.
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the Joint force, integrating partner sustainment capabilities toward the goal
of convergence is beneficial and critical to success.
In Asia-Pacif ic: A Strategic Assessment, David Lai warns of the danger of
overplaying the “U.S. card” in pursuing an over-militarized strategy to influence
territorial interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and Lai underscores the peril
of provoking China into reckless actions that risk moving from competition
into open conflict.6 To mitigate this risk and achieve bilateral solutions,
Lai recommends a strategic approach that reinforces the diplomatic and
economic elements of national power coupled with a smaller military
footprint.7 Large, conventional forward-postured US forces could have
a provocative rather than coercive or deterrent strategic effect. Embedded
adviser forces partnered with East Asian security forces can enable similar
combined multi-domain convergence and keep efforts in the competition
sphere instead of conflict.
A RAND Corporation study on security force assistance brigades
in Afghanistan conducted by Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg illustrates
potential capability gaps in the Indo-Pacific and highlights issues that could
result from employing conventional Joint forces trained and organized
for “highly-kinetic” operations in advise and assist roles.8 The employment
of large, conventional forces in adviser roles violates economy of force
by compelling a unit to execute a mission for which it is not equipped,
organized, or trained while underutilizing its capabilities. Instead, Payne
and Osburg recommend using specifically trained conventional advisers
to assist forces in enabling partner contribution. They note US operations
in Afghanistan caused a marked increase in “morale and enthusiasm”
among partnered forces operating with dedicated adviser forces rather than
conventional advisers.9
Payne and Osburg also underscore the importance of influencing two
to three countries at once by employing dispersed military organizations more
efficiently than conventional Joint forces.10 The ability to influence multiple
actors across a large, noncontiguous area of responsibility like the Indo-Pacific
is necessary for maximizing Army support to the air and maritime domains.
Also, Payne and Osburg suggest that, while it is sensible to align adviser
forces regionally for continuity of partner relationships, conventional Joint
6. David Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013), iv,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/527/.
7. Lai, Asia-Pacific, v.
8. Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg, Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan
for Global Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 12.
9. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 12.
10. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 14.
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forces are ill-suited for perpetual regional alignment due to global demand
for their aid and their limited multi-domain capabilities.11

Applicability to the Indo-Pacific Problem
The idea of the US Army reexamining roles in anticipation of a strategic
and operational shift from counterinsurgency operations originating
in US Central Command to competing with the People’s Republic of China,
Russia, and other global powers in the Indo-Pacific region is not a recent
development. As early as 2006, the US Army strategic planning guidance
outlined the need to prepare for a post-global war on terrorism strategic
and operational environment shift: “We must immediately begin the process
of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions,
organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve
our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready
force—a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.”12
To maintain the Army’s competitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific, leadership
must recognize the importance of enduring partner integration.13 Security
force assistance brigades represent a tailored, specifically trained unit large
enough to manifest the full range of partner capability. At the same time, they
are small enough to avoid strategically provocative connotations associated
with larger forward-postured conventional forces, making the brigades ideal
for the Army’s shift to the Indo-Pacific and supporting partners to compete
below the threshold of armed conflict.
Given that “joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team’s greatest
asset,” the Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023 suggests the best
opportunity to support the Joint force in the Indo-Pacific lies in “reassuring
friends, allies, and coalition partners” to dissuade and deter adversaries.14
In preserving a rules-based international order favorable to the United States
and its allies, the Army possesses the unique ability to build cohesive and
enduring teams among allies and partners. Integrating partner capabilities
to “sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation”
requires Army adviser forces to enable the execution of “simultaneous and
sequential operations distributed throughout a non-linear battlespace
and conducted in close coordination with interagency and multinational
partners,” synchronizing effects across all domains.15 Executing such
a mission requires an understanding of the multi-domain operational concept
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 34.
HQDA, The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006), 4.
HQDA, Military Competition, fig. E2, viii.
HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 4.
HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 5.
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and an ability to apply this understanding to complex, complicated, and
“wicked” problem sets without final solutions.16
Maintaining “favorable regional alliances” in the USINDOPACOM
area of operations hinges upon two critical regions: Northeast Asia and the
East Asian littoral.17 The fact that US strategic ends do not always directly
align with our partners’ and allies’ goals often complicates efforts to compete
with and deter adversaries. Deterrence can be achieved through synchronizing
partnered efforts in competition by shaping environments with Army special
operations forces (SOFs) and security force assistance brigades.18 Since
2013, conventional forces have played a significant role in competition
with non-allied great powers via brigade combat teams regionally aligned
force deterrent rotations to the Republic of Korea. Integrating special
operations forces and security force assistance brigades into the permanent
United Nations and Republic of Korea/US Coalition command-and-control
structures in doctrinal liaison roles would provide significant opportunities
to achieve unity of effort across all domains and establish the potential of the
United States’ East Asian littoral partners. It would also allow the embedded
brigades to shape the information space through interoperability and strategic
and operational messaging.19 Given most allies and partners in the East Asian
littorals possess a relative local advantage in the land domain, the brigades
could be the link in amplifying local advantage into a theater advantage.
While direct competition is distinct from conflict, it still risks using armed
force—mainly through proxies to gain or maintain advantage. Adversaries
in the Indo-Pacific, (such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),
already use proxies, shell corporations, and Islamic extremist organizations
in the Philippines. Since Army special operations forces and security
force assistance brigades are task-organized to win through partners, not
by closing with the enemy personally and directly, this focus makes them
appropriate and necessary to assist regional partners in neutralizing direct
adversary competition.
Indirect competition occurs when national interests are not directly
involved but actors pursue different aims within a similar environment.20
Maintaining relative advantage in indirect competition may involve averting
escalation to direct competition or conflict more than the pursuit or denial
16. Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” in Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared
Understanding of Wicked Problems (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2006).
17. HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 14.
18. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004).
19. Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age
(New York: Frank Cass, 2005).
20. HQDA, Military Competition, vi.
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of an objective. Employing brigades in emerging sub-theaters (like Vietnam,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia) could preempt Russian and Chinese attempts
to reassert influence over Southeast Asia. Brigades could leverage historical
animosity toward China and build enduring relationships with regional
security forces. By fostering and integrating partner capabilities across all
domains with US Joint capabilities, brigades have the potential to “preserve
and expand friendly (US, allies, and partners) advantages while limiting
or eroding adversary options, imposing costs, and increasing adversary doubts.
They can establish deterrence and set the conditions for military success
when deterrence fails.”21
To succeed in multi-domain competition in the Indo-Pacific, allies and
partners must be kept free from adversary coercion.22 The Indo-Pacific
Command should ensure the means employed are neither coercive
nor escalatory.23 To that end, the brigades can signal a willingness
for interoperability with Pacific allies and partners without the potentially
provocative act of increasing conventional ground-maneuver forces, naval
forces, and theater missile defense forces. Even if the Indo-Pacific Command
decided against that course of action, the brigades’ mere presence counters
adversary narratives that the United States is withdrawing from its role
as a global leader and creating a strategic power vacuum. Additionally, they
can, and should, be used to support foreign information warfare capabilities
to confront Russian and Chinese malign-information operations in the region.
Populous nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam maintain strong land component security forces, creating
an opportunity to embed US adviser forces and achieve greater synergy
in the land, cyber, information, and space domains. Although allied and
partner capabilities in the space and cyber domains lack the sophistication
of US capabilities, there are opportunities for the United States to foster
partnered integration in the space and cyber domains for competitive advantage
in ways that benefit partners without compromising US morals and ethics.
Nations like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are strategically located
within the layers of China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) network.
Furthermore, these nations have legal, political, strategic, and operational
caveats different from those of the United States, enabling the US military
to leverage these differences to advance US strategic interests where the
interests of our allies and partners do not align with the People’s Republic of
China. By partnering with the US military, nations in the Indo-Pacific would
21. HQDA, Military Competition, 2.
22. HQDA, Military Competition, ii.
23. Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American
Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 151,123.
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have opportunities for defense and security alliances; access to US resources,
military technology, and materiel; and the possibility of greater financial,
information, and economic cooperation.
Integration in these domains could create a relative advantage in preventing
the first potential battle of the next war (if it were to happen in the cyber
domain). While competition in the Indo-Pacific aims to avoid escalating
crisis into conflict, limiting a conflict’s scale and returning to competition
as rapidly as possible represents USINDOPACOM’s second concern.
To facilitate a return to competition from conflict, McConville asserts the
Army must maintain contact in all domains, hold adversary interests at risk,
impose costs on malign actions, enhance assurance, persist inside threat
systems (such as anti-access and area denial), and facilitate the transition
to competition.24 The embedded adviser forces of the security force assistance
brigades could serve as the connectors for maintaining contact across domains
while holding adversary interests at risk and imposing costs on malign actions
through partner interoperability.
The presence of adviser forces enhances the strategic position of East
Asian partners and enables continuous operations within adversary A2AD
zones. By bridging the range of operations throughout escalation to conflict,
embedded security force assistance brigades could present a unique
opportunity to facilitate the transition back to competition, as the bulk
of security cooperation and assistance operations remain in the competition
space, regardless. Moreover, enduring SFAB presence could create friendly
forward positions within Indo-Pacific threat A2AD networks. The brigades
distributed organization across echelons could mitigate the risk of isolation
within Chinese or Russian Indo-Pacific A2AD networks by creating a smaller
target than conventional forces.25
Despite their small size, the ongoing presence of security force
assistance brigades would support deterrence by providing a constant
reminder the United States could respond quickly to escalatory actions.
The 2006–23 Army strategic planning guidance suggests successful competition
in the Indo-Pacific relies upon “deterring aggression and countering coercion
against the U.S., its forces, allies and friends in critical areas of the world
by developing and maintaining the capability to swiftly defeat attacks
with only modest reinforcements.”26 Through enduring integration of security
force assistance brigades with partnered foreign-land component security
24. HQDA, Military Competition, 10.
25. US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), x.
26. HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 14.
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forces in the East Asian littorals, the United States reduces the potential
for more extensive force commitments should competition transition
to conflict. Effectively “dissuading adversaries from developing threatening
forces or ambitions, shaping the future military competition in ways that
are advantageous to the U.S. and complicating the planning and operations
of adversaries” would preempt more coercive forms of deterrence.27
Consequently, enduring SFAB integration with East Asian partnered land
components creates a deterrent in being with a lower risk of conflict escalation
across domains than other joint formations. Before partnered forces can
effectively dissuade adversaries as part of Joint and multinational competition
efforts, US forces must reassure partners “by demonstrating U.S. steadiness
of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance
common interests, and by strengthening and expanding alliances and security
relationships.”28 The brigades’ presence in the Indo-Pacific provides assurance
at a low risk and materiel cost compared to other joint capabilities.
If the first military problem presented by competition is how the
Joint forces prevent escalation from competition to conflict, then
successful security force assistance and security cooperation are critical.
Countering adversary competition actions in the USINDOPACOM area
of operation, US Army forces “as an element of the Joint force, conduct
Multi-Domain Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary,
Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial
systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic
objectives (win), and force a return to competition on favorable terms.”29
Crucial tenets of multi-domain competition include having forward-postured
expeditionary forces, massing cross-domain fires, maximizing human
potential, and layering options. Army special operations forces and security
force assistance brigades possess organic doctrine, organization, training, and
equipment to execute security force assistance and security cooperation across
each tenet.30
Building partner capacity is critical to succeeding in multi-domain
competition; therefore, the security force assistance brigade should play
a significant role. The brigades meet critical requirements for success
in multi-domain competition, including “[p]reparing the operational
environment by building partner capacity and interoperability and setting
the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights,
27. HQDA, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14.
28. HQDA, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14.
29. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, vii.
30. HQDA, Military Competition, iv.
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prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence
activities, and mapping EMS and computer networks.” Likewise, they help
with, “[b]uilding partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat
increasingly sophisticated Chinese and Russian-sponsored unconventional
and information warfare,” further emphasizing the criticality of combined,
partnered, and allied contributions to competition. Consequently, dedicated
adviser forces are critical to enabling partner capabilities in facilitating
successful multi-domain convergence.
Additionally, employing security force assistance brigades could effectively
mitigate the military risks posed by China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific
region. The Army multi-domain operating concept highlights that, while
Chinese and Russian military systems in the Indo-Pacific are robust, they
depend on a predictable, pattern-bound enemy. Beyond simply alternating
US Joint force posture, embedding adviser units with East Asian partnered
security forces generates more options and increases the width and depth
of the battlefield across domains for potential threat actors. Combined (that
is, multinational) rather than US-only force posture alternation enables
strategic and operational deception efforts across domains.31
As China and Russia have developed “space, cyber, information, and
electronic warfare (EW ) capabilities that can halt American power
projection before it begins,” the need to augment partnered land capabilities
in achieving convergence will only increase. Partnered security forces in the
USINDOPACOM area of operations represent forward-postured allied
capabilities within Chinese and Russian A2AD zones. Brigades can leverage
partners already present in theater (like Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan)
to compete in the land, air, and maritime domains other US forces cannot
enter without escalating to conflict. In the multi-domain operating concept,
security force assistance brigades competing through partners provide
“overmatch through speed and range at the point of need.”32
McConville explains how the Army’s contribution to multi-domain
competition rests on three lines of effort—engaging and training, equipping
and enabling, and advising and assisting to “[e]xpand the [l]andpower
[n]etwork.”33 The security force assistance brigade is currently the only
Army formation doctrinally trained and equipped to execute each line
of effort simultaneously for itself and a partnered force. While McConville’s
white paper specifies competing in the land domain, the contribution of
East Asian littoral land component security forces to air, littoral, cyber,
31. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 29.
32. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 1.
33. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 2.
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space, and information operations suggests an expanded role in achieving
convergence through partners.
Security force assistance brigades could play a vital role in countering Russia
and China’s attempts to “outflank” US partnerships and alliances using the
space, cyber, and information domains to fracture alliances below the threshold
of armed conflict.34 While some scholars question the efficacy of Westphalian
alliance systems, the presence of brigades in the theater with partnered forces
represents a clear assurance of the United States’ commitment to partner
defense. The brigades’ presence also disrupts Russian and Chinese coercion
attempts by physically emplacing forces within the competition space,
which forces adversaries to account for them in their decision calculus.35
Beyond enabling partnered contributions in the land domain, brigades could
assist partners in deterring attempts to fracture allied command-and-control
architecture in the cyber, space, and information domains in a foreign internal
defense capacity.36
Embedding security force assistance brigades with East Asian partners
raises the stakes of fait accompli attacks while extending operational
reach. Brigades can advise foreign security force fires while simultaneously
integrating US joint fires in-depth across domains. Their integration into
allied command-and-control architecture in East Asia flattens organizational
hierarchies while reducing friction. Although not organically organized
to prevail in large-scale ground combat, SFAB-partnered interoperability
in competition dramatically reduces the risk of large-scale ground combat
in the first place.
Security force assistance brigades in allied and partnered nations will
provide many of the same capabilities as conventional forces and reduce
the burden on host nations. Brigades possess the same communication
systems as conventional Army forces, in addition to others found only in the
special operations community. They possess the ability to clear joint fires
at the brigade and battalion levels and within the fires battalion and joint fires
observers in the infantry battalion and cavalry squadron. They are also capable
of executing the operations process like conventional brigades and battalions.
The smaller scale of the brigade staffs, however, requires careful allocation
of resources and efforts to balance advise, assist, support, liaise (with), and

34. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 3.
35. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (July 2003): 427ff.
36. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 3.
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enable (AASLE) operations to coordinate with conventional operations,
depending on the mission and operating environment.
One of the chief areas where a brigade’s smaller scale could and should be
employed is in synchronization efforts with allies and partners in the cyber
domain. The US Army cyberspace operations concept describes how China
and Russia attempt to “capitalize on emerging technologies to establish and
maintain a cultural and social advantage; leveraging these new capabilities
for command and control, recruiting, coordinating logistics, raising funds,
and propagandizing their message” in the Indo-Pacific.37 A foundational
dimension of the Joint and Army cyber approach in countering Chinese
and Russian competition in cyberspace relies upon “strategic engagement,
which involves keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad, and generating
support or empathy for the mission.”38 Understanding that the maintenance
of competitive advantage in cyberspace relies on coordinating all combinedforce capabilities, since the cyber domain pervades all others, the need to
synchronize allied and partnered cyber efforts in Indo-Pacific competition
will only increase.
While the current SFAB organization does not contain dedicated cyber
forces, signal capabilities within headquarters adviser teams and the SFAB
signal company are capable of augmenting US Cyber Command cyber combat
mission teams. The Army cyberspace operations concept defines the cyber
domain as a “global domain within the information environment consisting
of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems,
and embedded processors and controllers.”39 The brigades have recognized
the cyber domain’s influence on the information domain. Consequently, they
have sought to contribute to convergence through operational messaging
and dedicated support to partner information operations to counter malign
Chinese and Russian information campaigns.
The SFAB’s robust organic signal capabilities create opportunities to link
less secure or sophisticated allied and partnered networks to the Department
of Defense networks at a lower cost and risk than directly linking foreign
networks. The same logic theoretically applies to the space domain.
Although most East Asian littoral allies and partners possess limited
space capabilities, a brigade’s ability to provide a secure coupling between
foreign and US networks allows partners to benefit from the full range
37. TRADOC, The U.S. Army Concept Capability Plan for Cyberspace Operations, 2016-2028 TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-7-8 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2010), i.
38. TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, i.
39. TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 68.
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of US space capabilities, including navigation and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance.
Given the unprecedented speed with which adversaries can seize
positions of advantage in cyberspace, having security force assistance
brigades on-site and operating with partnered cyber forces would create
an improved, competitive deterrent complex.40 A brigade’s role as an adviser
on foreign military sales could aid East Asian littoral partners with the
constantly evolving hardware and software necessary to compete in the cyber,
information, and space domains.41 Given that an increasing amount of cyber
equipment acquisition comes from foreign vendors, the ability of brigades
to influence investment in software and hardware for partners and the Joint
force is potentially considerable.42
Adversaries employ “sponsorship, training, education, skills, motivation,
or tools” competing via proxies in the space, cyber, and information domains.
Therefore, embedded adviser forces with East Asian partners executing such
lines of effort could preempt Chinese and Russian attempts to gain relative
advantage in the cyber domain within the Indo-Pacific.43 The Joint force
currently possesses limited forces in the Indo-Pacific theater to liaise with
or train foreign security forces in cyber, space, and information operations.44
Additional training or organizational changes would be necessary for brigades
to provide training, education, and skills to East Asian partnered cyber forces.
The presence of regionally aligned brigade forces in the Indo-Pacific creates
an opportunity to bridge time delays in deploying combat cyber support teams
to the theater. It also supports the Army cyberspace operating requirement
that “the Army’s battle command system must be able to exchange relevant
operational information with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental
multinational partners, nongovernmental organizations and contractors.”45
Furthermore, embedding brigade advisers enables the subsequent cyberspace
operating requirement of integrating “coalition partner(s) and other specified
networks during garrison and deployed operations, including the capability
to integrate into the networks of coalition partners with different
intelligence-sharing relationships in order to enable effective Joint
and/or multinational operations and ensure freedom of action.”46

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 10.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 11.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 12.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 13.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 39.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 48.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 48.
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Realistically, supplemental training on cyber operations would be necessary
for most existing brigade advisers.

Conclusion
Security force assistance brigades represent the connective tissue or hub
necessary to enable unified action and unity of effort across the multinational
command-and-control architecture in the Indo-Pacific Command. A first step the
Army can take to make full use of a brigade’s capabilities would be to embed
SFAB advisers beyond the tactical level. Building on this step, the Army,
in conjunction with the Indo-Pacific Command and grand strategic command
authorities, must seek opportunities to integrate security force assistance
brigades with regional allies and partners whom the United States does not
historically possess enduring peacetime security agreements (such as Vietnam,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malyasia).
In addition, the Army must seek opportunities to employ brigades
in lieu of conventional ground-combat formations, where appropriate,
to enable cooperation, retain relative advantage in competition,
and maintain competition below the threshold of armed conflict. The presence
of embedded SFAB advisers with East Asian allied and partnered
multi-domain components links partnered capabilities to the US Indo-Pacific
Command Joint multi-domain convergence effort. Furthermore, the brigades’
small organizational profile allows them to embed with East Asian allies
and partners and passively penetrate threat A2AD networks, circumventing
the military problem of power projection in a denied environment.
By integrating security force assistance brigades with partnered foreign
security forces, the US Army can leverage partner multi-domain capabilities
in ways that complement US Joint and interagency capabilities,
deter adversaries, and create relative advantage, enabling successful
competition for the United States and allies across domains.
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